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Abstract
The impossibility results in judgement aggregation
show a clash between fair aggregation procedures
and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we
are interested in analysing the notion of rational
outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical under-
standing of collective rationality. In particular, we
use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided
by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained no-
tion of group reasoning that allows for studying
collective rationality with respect to a number of
logics. We analyse the well-known paradoxes in
judgement aggregation and we pinpoint the reason-
ing steps that trigger the inconsistencies. Moreover,
we extend the map of possibility and impossibility
results in judgement aggregation by discussing the
case of substructural logics. In particular, we show
that there exist fragments of linear logic for which
general possibility results can be obtained.
1 Introduction
The problem of aggregating logically connected proposi-
tions into a collective rational outcome by means of a pro-
cedure that respects certain fairness desiderata has recently
become an important topic in logic, AI and multiagent sys-
tems. Judgement Aggregation (JA) is a recent branch of so-
cial choice theory that originated from the study of the vot-
ing procedures that aggregate the opinions of judges in colle-
gial courts [List and Pettit, 2002; List and Puppe, 2009]. JA
has recently become an important theory for studying general
aggregation of heterogeneous information [Dietrich and List,
2008a; Endriss, 2011]. Many results in JA show that it is not
possible to aggregate individual rational judgements, usually
expressed in classical propositional logic, by means of pro-
cedures that balance fairness and efficiency. For instance, the
majority rule faces the so called discursive dilemmas [List
and Pettit, 2002]: even if individual judgements are rational,
the outcome that we obtain by majority may not be. Most of
the impossibility theorems in judgement aggregation rely on
a classical understanding of rationality, i.e. they are about in-
dividuals and societies that reason in (fragments of) classical
logic. Moreover, most of the models assume that the individ-
ual rationality and the collective rationality are to be of a same
logical type. The impossibility results in JA can be rephrased
by saying that fair aggregation procedures do not preserve in-
dividual rationality. Furthermore, the possibility results that
have been discussed in the literature on JA usually depend on
severe restrictions of the language that the agents use to ex-
press their judgements, i.e. on the syntactic structure of the
agenda, and not on the inferences that are permissible.
In this paper, we want to provide an analysis of discur-
sive dilemmas and collective rationality by using a proof-
theoretical view of logic and reasoning. In particular, we
shall use the precise analysis of proofs and inferences pro-
vided by the sequent calculus for linear logic [Girard, 1995;
Troelstra, 1992]. We intend to contribute to the JA frame-
work along the two following directions. Firstly, we present
a proof-theoretical treatment of collective rationality that
shows precisely the reasoning steps that lead to collective
contradictions. By pinpointing the inference rules that causes
the dilemmas, we can extend the map of possibility and im-
possibility results to substructural reasoning. Secondly, we
define a model in which individual rationality can be evalu-
ated with respect to a certain logic L, whereas collective ra-
tionality can be defined with respect to a possibly different
logic L′.
The motivations for this work are twofold. On the one
hand, reasoning in substructural logics has important appli-
cation in modelling causal and non-monotonic reasoning or
resource bounded inferences. On the other hand, the analysis
of the paradoxes in social choice theory by means of a fine-
grained account of collective rationality suggests new diag-
nosis of collective inconsistencies.
Several logics for judgement aggregation have been dis-
cussed in the literature [List and Puppe, 2009; Endriss, 2011;
Dietrich, 2010; 2007]. A preliminary investigation of the re-
lationship between JA and linear logic has been presented
in [Porello, 2012]. A significant related work is [Dietrich,
2007]. It includes results in JA that are obtained in general
logics, i.e. with respect to a general notion of consequence
relation. However, the results there do not apply directly
to our analysis of substructural reasoning, since the conse-
quence relations discussed in [Dietrich, 2007] are standard in
the Tarskian sense, e.g. they are monotonic.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present the linear logic approach to proof-theory
and we discuss some insights linking linear logic and col-
lective reasoning. Section 3 contains our model of JA and
presents a definition of group reasoning in proof-theoretical
terms. Section 4 presents a number of possibility and impos-
sibility results for the majority rule with respect to a number
of substructural logics. Section 5 contains possibility results
for aggregators that take sets of judgements that are rational
wrt classical logic and return sets of judgement evaluated wrt
fragments of LL. Section 6 extends the previous treatment
to classes of aggregators characterised by important axioms
in social choice theory. Section 7 sketches an application to
preference aggregation. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background on Linear Logic and Sequent
Calculi
Besides providing a logical modelling for resource bounded
reasoning, Linear Logic (LL) can be considered an analysis of
proofs in classical or intuitionistic logic that provides a closer
inspection of inference rules. For example, the structural
rules of classical sequent calculus [Troelstra and Schwicht-
enberg, 2000] weakening (W) and contraction (C) (Table 1)
are no longer (globally) valid in LL, as they would allow us
to delete or to add arbitrary copies of hypotheses. If we drop
weakening and contraction, the rules that define logical con-
nectives in sequent calculus have to be split into two classes:
the additives, that combine two proofs by forcing to share the
same context, and the multiplicatives, that combine proofs by
non-sharing and making copies of the contexts. Accordingly,
in LL there are two different types of conjunction, a mul-
tiplicative conjunction ⊗ (tensor) and an additive conjunc-
tion & (with), and two types of disjunctions, multiplicative
` (parallel) and additive ⊕ (plus). Implications can be de-
fined by means of disjunctions and negations as usual. For
example, LL implication is A( B ≡ ¬A ` B. Intuitively,
LL captures resource bounded reasoning and non-monotonic
inferences. For example, suppose the proper axiom e ` c rep-
resents the inference “if I have one euro (e), then I buy one
coffee (c)”. In classical logic, one can infer by means of con-
traction e ` e ∧ c, namely, that I still have one euro, besides
having the coffee. By dropping contraction, LL captures a
form of causality: the antecedent has to be consumed during
the inferential process.
Given a set of propositional atoms A, the language of LL
is defined as follows.1
LLL ::= A | L⊥ | L⊗ L | L` L | L⊕ L | L& L
The sequent calculus for LL is presented in Table 1. A se-
quent is an expression Γ ` ∆, where Γ and ∆ denote multi-
sets of occurrences of formulas.
In what follows, we shall assume that the exchange rule (E)
always holds. If we also assume that (W) and (C) hold, then
the additive and multiplicative rules for the two conjunctions
become equivalent. In that case, the propositional operators
⊗ and & collapse and the meaning of the conjunction is the
classical one. The same holds for disjunctions. Thus, we shall
1We consider the multiplicative-additive fragment of LL. An-
other important part of LL is given by the exponentials, that allow
for retrieving the usual classical inferences in a controlled way. We
leave a discussion of the exponential for future work.
use the standard notation, i.e. a∧ b and a∨ b, when we intend
to refer to classical logic (CL), namely, in case we assume
that the structural rules hold.2 We denote LCL the language
of classical logic.
Identities
ax
A ` A
Γ, A ` ∆ Γ′ ` A,∆′
cut
Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′
Negation
Γ ` A,∆
L¬
Γ,¬A ` ∆
Γ, A ` ∆
R¬
Γ ` ¬A,∆
Multiplicatives
Γ ` A,∆ Γ′ ` B,∆′⊗R
Γ,Γ′ ` A⊗B,∆,∆′
Γ, A,B ` ∆ ⊗L
Γ, A⊗B ` ∆
Γ, A ` ∆ Γ′, B ` ∆′`L
Γ,Γ′, A`B ` ∆,∆′
Γ ` A,B,∆ `R
Γ ` A`B,∆
Additives
Γ ` A,∆ Γ ` B,∆
&R
Γ ` A&B,∆
Γ, Ai ` ∆
&L
Γ, A0&A1 ` ∆
Γ, A ` ∆ Γ, B ` ∆⊕L
Γ, A⊕B ` ∆
Γ ` Ai,∆ ⊕R
Γ ` A0 ⊕A1,∆
Structural Rules
Γ, A,B,Γ′ ` ∆
E
Γ, B,A,Γ′ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆, A,B,∆′
E
Γ ` ∆, B,A,∆′
Γ, A,A,` ∆
C
Γ, A ` ∆
Γ ` ∆, A,A
C
Γ ` ∆, A
Γ ` ∆ W
Γ, A ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ W
Γ ` ∆, A
Table 1: Sequent calculus for LL
Linear logic is sound and complete wrt to its semantics [Gi-
rard, 1995]. Moreover, LL enjoys cut elimination. An analy-
sis of the complexity of proof search for various fragments of
LL is presented in [Lincoln et al., 1992].
2.1 Coalitional reasoning in LL
The idea of this work is to model a concept of group reason-
ing by using the awareness that LL provides of contexts and
inferences. We shall model coalitions of agents that support
formulas as contexts Γ in the sequent calculus. For example,
if the group can infer a conjunction of two sentences, A and
2Without W and C, also negation behaves differently. For ex-
ample, the ex falso quodlibet principle is no longer globally valid in
linear logic. For sake of simplicity, we shall use a single notation for
negation.
B, according to a given voting rule, this might have two in-
terpretations. Firstly, there exists a single winning coalition Γ
such that Γ ` A and Γ ` B, therefore Γ ` A&B. Secondly,
there exist two different winning coalitions such that Γ ` A
and ∆ ` B, therefore Γ,∆ ` A⊗B.
Consider the following famous example of discur-
sive dilemma on the agenda of propositions {a, b, a ∧
b,¬a,¬b,¬(a ∧ b)}. We want to take a closer look at the
reasoning steps that are required in order to infer the contra-
diction. Consider the following profile, where three individu-
als express their opinions about propositions in the agenda as
follows.
a a ∧ b b ¬a ¬(a ∧ b) ¬b
i1 1 1 1 0 0 0
i2 1 0 0 0 1 1
i3 0 0 1 1 1 0
maj. 1 0 1 0 1 0
Each agent has a consistent set of propositions, however, by
majority, the collective set {a, b,¬(a ∧ b)} is not consistent.
We can infer the contradiction in the collective set by reason-
ing in CL as follows.
{i1, i2} ` a
W{i1, i2, i3} ` a
{i1, i3} ` b
W{i1, i2, i3} ` b
R∧{i1, i2, i3} ` a ∧ b
We start with non-logical axioms {i1, i2} ` a and {i1, i3} `
b. By weakening, we introduce the conjunction of a and b by
using the same coalition. Moreover, the group can infer ¬(a∧
b) as we have the axiom: {i2, i3} ` ¬(a ∧ b). Therefore, the
group is inconsistent wrt CL, as we can prove a∧b and ¬(a∧
b) by using the winning coalitions. This entails, by (cut), that
we can prove ∅. If we drop W and C, the contradiction is
not longer derivable. If the group reasons in LL, we have
again axioms: {i1, i2} ` a, {i1, i3} ` b. Moreover, suppose
we use the additive conjunction to interpret the third axiom:
{i2, i3} ` ¬(a & b). The group can infer a ⊗ b by using two
different coalitions:
{i1, i2} ` a {i1, i3} ` b
R⊗{i1, i2}, {i1, i3} ` a⊗ b
However, in LL a ⊗ b and ¬(a & b) are not inconsistent, be-
cause a ⊗ b,¬(a & b) 0LL ∅. LL provides then a logical
interpretation of the fact that there is no winning coalition
for a ∧ b, whereas there are winning coalitions for a and b.
Accordingly, we cannot infer a & b, since there is no single
coalition that supports both a and b.
In the remainder of this paper, we want to show that this
remark corresponds to more general properties of linear logic.
We shall discuss the following logics that are obtained by
restricting the language of LL.
MLL ¬, ⊗, `
ALL ¬, &, ⊕
MALL ¬, ⊗, `, &, ⊕
Moreover, we shall discuss the logics: L + (W) and L + (C)
that are obtained by adding weakening or contraction to the
logic L. Note that CL is equivalent to assuming MALL + (W)
and (C).
3 The model
Let N be a (finite) set of agents. An agenda XL is a (fi-
nite) set of propositions in the language LL of a given logic
L that is closed under complements. i.e. non-double nega-
tions. Moreover, we shall assume that the agenda does not
contain tautologies or contradictions. We slightly rephrase
the usual rationality conditions on judgment sets in terms of
sequents derivability. A judgement set J is a subset of XL
such that J is (wrt L) consistent (J 0L ∅), complete (for all
φ ∈ XL, φ ∈ J or ¬φ ∈ J) and deductive closed (if J `L φ
and φ ∈ XL, φ ∈ J). Denote J(XL) the set of all judge-
ment sets on XL. A profile of judgements sets J is a vector
(J1, . . . , Jn), where n = |N |.
We shall discuss agendas defined in a number of languages
and logics. We intend to model aggregators that take profiles
of judgments sets that are rational according to a given logic
L and return a set of judgement which can be evaluated with
respect to a (possibly) different logic L′. In case L and L′
are the same, we are in the standard situation in JA and we
will discuss, in the next section, how aggregators behave wrt
fragments of linear logic. In case the languages of L and L′
are different, we need to define a translation function from
the language of L into the language of L′. In general, a trans-
lation is just a function that maps formulas of one language
into the other t : LL → LL′ . An aggregator is then a function
F : J(XL)n → J(X ′L′) such that F is the composition of an
aggregator in the standard JA sense (F ′ : L(X )n → P(X ))
with a function T : P(XL) → P(X ′L′) that lifts t to sets of
propositions: for J ⊂ XL, T (J) = {t(φ) | φ ∈ J} ⊂ X ′L′ .
Thus, we have that F (J) = T (F ′(J)) ⊆ XL′ . For exam-
ple, the majority rule M : J(X )n → J(X ′L′) is defined as
follows. Let Nφ = {i | φ ∈ Ji}, define M ′ : J(XL)n →
P(XL) such that M ′(J) = {φ ∈ XL | |Nφ| > n/2}; then,
given a translation t, M(J) = T (M ′(J)). Note that our defi-
nition allows for aggregators that return sets of judgments that
are inconsistent wrt L and that may turn not to be inconsis-
tent wrt L′. That is why the codomain of F ′ is the powerset
P(XL). We shall concentrate on the following additive trans-
lation of CL into LL: ADD : LCL → LLL. ADD is defined
as follows: for a atomic, ADD(a) = a and ADD(¬a) = ¬a;
for A in LCL, ADD(¬A) = ¬(ADD(A)), ADD(A ∧ B) =
ADD(A)& ADD(B), ADD(A∨B) = ADD(A)⊕ADD(B) (i.e.
we replace each classical connective with its additive counter-
part). The translation reflects our interpretation of LL reason-
ing as coalitional reasoning. In particular, M : J(XCL)n →
J(XLL) defined by M(J) = ADD(M ′(J)) embeds classical
formulas that are accepted according to the majority rule into
LL by viewing them as additive formulas (i.e. they are collec-
tively accepted because of a winning coalition that supports
them). Thus, as we shall see, additives refer to the same win-
ning coalition, whereas multiplicatives shall be used to reason
about different winning coalitions.
3.1 Group Reasoning
In order to investigate collective rationality for a number of
logics, we introduce the following notion of group reasoning.
We say that Nφ is a winning coalition wrt F , and we denote
itWφ, iff φ ∈ F (J). We assume a distinguished set of propo-
sitional atoms i1, . . . in one for each agent in N . We model
group reasoning in a given logic L as follows. We add to the
language of L the set of atoms i1, . . . , in. We define non-
logical or proper axioms Wφ ` φ for any φ ∈ F (J) .3 The
idea is that group reasoning is performed by using as assump-
tions the formulas that are elected according to F and keeping
track of their winning coalitions throughout reasoning.
Definition 1 (Group reasoning). We say that the group infers
a formula φ ∈ LL according to L iff, for some sequence of
Wj ` φj , there is a proof W1, ...,Wm `L φ.
Thus, the notion of group reasoning depends on the logic L,
on the profile, as well as on the aggregation rule that defines
the non-logical axioms.
Definition 2. We say that group reasoning is consistent wrt
L iff the sequent W1, . . . ,Wm `L ∅ is not derivable in L for
any sequence of winning coalition.
Our notion of group consistency corresponds to the standard
model-theoretic view of consistency of a set of judgments J
(i.e. there exists a valuation that makes the formulas in J true)
as follows.
Fact 1. Group reasoning wrt L is consistent iff the set J =
{φ | there are W1, . . . ,Wm s.t. W1, . . . ,Wm `L φ} has a
model.
For sound and complete calculi,4 we have that J has a model
iff J 0 ∅. By slightly extending the terminology in [Endriss
et al., 2010], we introduce the following definition of safety
of an agenda.
Definition 3. We say that an agenda XL is safe for a class
of aggregators F wrt the logic L iff group reasoning wrt L is
consistent for any F .
Safety means that there is no profile that leads to an incon-
sistent outcome wrt L when we aggregate sets by using an
aggregator in a given class. In what follows we concentrate
on the class consisting just of the majority rules, whereas in
Section 6 we discuss other classes of aggregators. Accord-
ing to well-known results in JA [List and Puppe, 2009], the
majority rule leads to inconsistency wrt classical logic iff the
agenda XCL violates the so called median property: every
minimally inconsistent set Y ⊆ XCL (i.e. an inconsistent set
Y such that every subset of Y is consistent) has size at most
2. For example, the agenda containing {a, b,¬(a ∧ b)} vio-
lates the median property. By Fact 1, on such agendas also
group reasoning is consistent. Thus, our definition of group
reasoning allows for rephrasing the standard JA results [List
and Puppe, 2009].
Theorem 1. An agendaXCL is safe for the majority ruleM :
J(XCL)n → J(XCL) wrt CL iff XCL satisfies the median
property.
4 Majority and Substructural Reasoning
We can now state an interesting possibility result. If we define
agendas in ALL, then the majority rule is always consistent.
3For sequent calculi with proper axiom, cf. [Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg, 2000].
4All the sequent calculi that we are using here are sound and
complete with respect to the semantics of linear logic [Girard, 1995],
[Troelstra, 1992].
In what follows, we shall assume that n is odd. The key prop-
erty for stating this result is the following: (F) in additive
linear logic (ALL) (i.e. just the rules for ¬, & and ⊕), every
provable sequent contains exactly two formulas (e.g. A ` B).
This property has been stated in [Hughes and van Glabbeek,
2003]5. If we inspect the additive rules, we see that they can-
not add any new proposition. Thus, since every proof starts
with axioms A ` A, every provable sequent contains two for-
mulas of ALL. This easily entails that there are no minimal
inconsistent subsets of size bigger than three in ALL (if J is
inconsistent in ALL, then J `ALL ∅). Thus, majority is safe
for every ALL agenda.
Theorem 2. Any agenda XALL is safe for the majority rule
M : J(XALL)n → J(XALL) wrt ALL.
It is interesting to stress that Theorem 2 is a possibility results
wrt to a logic (i.e. a sound and complete logical calculus
that enjoys cut elimination). Thus, the language restriction
provided by ALL corresponds to allowing certain types of
well-behaved inferences. Moreover, the same language is not
safe, if we add more reasoning power. If we add weakening
(W) to ALL, then there are agendas that are no longer safe for
majority.
Proposition 1. Agendas X in ALL are not safe for majority
rule M : J(XALL)n → J(XALL) wrt ALL + (W).
Proof. (Sketch) Take the agenda in ALL that includes
{a, b,¬(a & b)}. For Theorem 2, we know that majority
is consistent wrt ALL. Consider a profile such that there
are winning coalitions that provide the following axioms:
W1 ` a, W2 ` b and W3 ` ¬(a & b) (e.g. the profile in
Section 2.1). In ALL + (W), we have the following proof.
W1 ` a W
W1,W2 ` a
W2 ` b W
W1,W2 ` b
W1,W2 ` a& b
Since W3 ` ¬(a & b), group reasoning is inconsistent, as
W1,W2,W3 entails a contradiction.
Weakening entails that A ⊗ B ` A & B is provable [Gi-
rard, 1995]. Thus, by adding weakening, the group can infer
that two different coalitions that support A and B (respec-
tively) also support their additive conjunction. Basically, that
is what happens, from a logical point of view, when we in-
fer the contradiction in CL of the discursive dilemma. Note
that the impossibility stated by Proposition 1 does not depend
on the language of the agenda. Proposition 1 shows that lan-
guage restrictions may not be sufficient to guarantee consis-
tency, and that corresponds to the fact that there are minimally
inconsistent sets of cardinality 3 in ALL + W.
By adding contraction (C) to ALL, agendas in ALL are still
safe for the majority rules. The reason is that contraction can
only shrink the number of formulas in a provable sequent.
Thus, if there is no provable sequent with more that two for-
mulas in ALL, the same holds for ALL + (C).
5This property holds, provided we do not include the logical con-
stants for true and false in the language of ALL. Moreover, it implies
that for ALL is redundant to assume that the agenda does not contain
tautologies or contradictions.
We consider now the majority rule defined on multiplica-
tive agendas, namely M : J(XMLL)n → J(XMLL). In this
case, we have no general possibility result and the median
property characterises again safe agendas.
Theorem 3. An agendaXMLL is safe forM : J(XMLL)n →
J(XMLL) iff XMLL satisfies the median property.
Proof. (Sketch) For one direction, take for example the
agenda {A,B,¬A,¬B,A ⊗ B,¬(A ⊗ B)}. It violates the
median property, asA,B,¬(A⊗B) is minimally inconsistent
and it has size 3 (i.e. A,B,¬(A⊗B) ` ∅). Take a profile with
three individuals that provides proper axioms {i1, i2} ` A,
{i1, i3} ` B and {i2, i3} ` ¬(A ⊗ B). The profile makes
group reasoning by majority inconsistent wrt MLL.
On the other hand, suppose XMLL satisifies the median
property. For sake of contradiction, suppose that M(J) is in-
consistent wrt MLL. Thus there is a minimal inconsistent set
in M(J) with cardinality 2, as the agenda by definition does
not contain contradictions. Thus, there are formulas A and B
such that A,B `MLL ∅. That means that there are two se-
quences of coalitionsW1, . . .Wl andWl+1, . . .Wm such that
W1, . . .Wl ` A and Wl+1, . . .Wm ` B. Since the intersec-
tion of Wj is not empty (|Wj | ≥ n/2), it entails that there
is an individual such that his judgement set entails A and B,
against the consistency of each individual judgement set.
5 Extending group reasoning
In this section, in order to meet the standard hypothesis in
JA, we focus on the case in which individuals reason in CL
and we will evaluate group reasoning wrt fragments of LL.
By Theorem 2, we know that every agenda in ALL is safe for
the majority rule. Thus, by using the additive translation ADD
we know that agendas in CL are safe for M : J(XCL)n →
J(XALL) with M(J) = ADD(M ′(J)) wrt group reasoning in
ALL.
Corollary 1. Any agenda XCL is safe for the majority rule
M : J(XCL)n → J(XALL) wrt ALL.
We can extend the previous result, by showing that the ma-
jority is always consistent wrt reasoning in LL, provided the
additive translation that we have introduced. We define the
deductive closure of a set X wrt to L and we denote clL(X),
as the set {A | X `L A}.
Corollary 2. Every agendasXCL is safe for the majority rule
wrt clMALL(M(J)).
Proof. (Sketch) By Theorem 2, M(J) is always consistent
wrtALL. If a set is consistent wrt a logicL, then its deductive
closure wrt L is consistent (provided that the logic is sound).
Since the rules of MALL are sound for sets of formulas in
ALL, clMALL(M(J)) is consistent.
Note that the same argument cannot be applied to adding
weakening. The reason is that (W) is not sound wrt MALL.
Accordingly, Proposition 1 shows that adding weakening
makes M(J) inconsistent. Theorem 2 shows that majority
guarantee consistent outcomes, provided we keep track of
the winning coalitions that support accepted formulas. Ad-
ditive connectives presuppose a same winning coalition for a
given formula A, whereas multiplicatives can be used in or-
der to consistently combine formulas supported by different
winning coalitions.
6 Axiomatic analysis
In the previous sections, we presented our treatment for a con-
crete aggregation procedure, i.e the majority rule. In this sec-
tion, we discuss substructural reasoning wrt classes of aggre-
gation functions defined by means of well-known axioms in
JA and social choice theory. We shall discuss the following
axioms that specifies classes of aggregators F . We say that
an aggregator is complement-free iff and aggregator never re-
turns A and ¬A.6 Some of the axioms have been adapted in
order to cope with aggregators that associate different logics.
Weak rationality (WR): F (J) is complete and
complement-free wrt L.
Anonymity (A): For any profile J and permutation σ : N →
N , F (J1, . . . , Jn) = F (Jσ(1), . . . , Jσ(n)).
Neutrality (N): For any A and B in XL and profile J, if for
all i A ∈ Ji ⇔ B ∈ Ji, then t(A) ∈ F (J) ⇔ t(B) ∈
F (J).
Independence (I): For any A ∈ XL and profiles J, J′ ∈
J(XL)n, if A ∈ Ji ⇔ A ∈ J ′i , then t(A) ∈ F (J) ⇔
t(A) ∈ F (J′).
Monotonicity (M): For any A ∈ XL and profiles J =
(J1, . . . , Ji, . . . , Jn) and J′ = (J1, . . . , J ′i , . . . , Jn) if
A /∈ Ji and A ∈ J ′i , then t(A) ∈ F (J)⇒ t(A) ∈ F (J’)
Acceptance-rejection neutrality (arN): For any A,B ∈
XL and any profile J ∈ J(XL)n, we have that if
A ∈ Ji ⇔ B /∈ Ji for all agents i ∈ N , then
t(A) ∈ F (J)⇔ t(B) /∈ F (J).
(A) states that the aggregator does not favour any particular
agent and (N) implies that it does not favour any particular
proposition. (I) means that the outcome of F wrt a proposi-
tionA in two different profiles only depends on the patterns of
acceptance in the two profiles. (M) implies that, by increas-
ing the support of a proposition, F does not change its accep-
tance. (arN) has been introduced in [Dietrich and List, 2008b;
2009] in order to characterise aggregators in case of a weaker
assumption of individual rationality, namely in case individ-
ual judgements sets are just assumed to be consistent. (arN)
means that the aggregator is not biased either for or against
the acceptance of any proposition.
By adapting May’s theorem [May, 1952], it is known that
the majority rule is characterised by the following axioms
[List and Puppe, 2009; Endriss et al., 2010]
Proposition 2. F : J(XL)n → J(XL) is the majority rule iff
F satisfies (WR), (A), (N), (I) and (M).
Since the notion of weak rationality does not depend on a
particular logic, just on the minimal assumption that a logic
contains some syntactic form of negation, the characterisation
holds also for the majority rule defined on any L that we have
previously introduced.
6This condition is weaker than consistency as it excludes just
inconsistent sets that include a formula and its syntactic negation.
By Theorem 2, we know that, wrt to reasoning in ALL,
there are procedures that satisfy (WR), (A), (N), (I) and (M),
namely the majority rule. We discuss possible extension of
such class by weakening some of the axioms that characterise
majority. In particular, since MLL or ALL + W are not safe
for majority, it means that they are not safe for any class of
aggregators that includes majority. Thus, we focus on ALL.
Proposition 3. Agendas in XALL are not safe for aggrega-
tors F satisfying (WR), (A), and (N).
Proof. We show that there is an agenda in ALL and an ag-
gregator that satisfies the axioms above that return an incon-
sistent outcome. Take and agenda in ALL that consists of
{a,¬a, a & b,¬(a & b)}. Consider a profile with 3 agents
such that agent J1 = {¬a,¬(a & b)}, J2 = {a, a & b}
and J3 = {a,¬(a & b)}. Take the aggregator F such that
A ∈ F (J) if 0 or 1 agents has A ∈ Ji and A /∈ F (J) if
more than one agent has A ∈ Ji. F is clearly satisfies (WR),
(A), and (N). Thus, there are winning coalitions: {i1} ` ¬a,
{i2} ` a& b and ¬a, a& b `ALL ∅.
By analogous arguments, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Agendas in XALL are not safe for aggrega-
tors F that satisfy (WR), (A), and (I).
Uniform quota rules are characterised by (A), (N), (I) and (M)
[Endriss et al., 2010]. Again, ALL is not safe for this class.
Proposition 5. Agendas in XALL are not safe for aggrega-
tors F satisfying (A), (N), (I) and (M).
It is enough to set the threshold for acceptance to q ≥ 1
(i.e. take the union of all formulas that are accepted by some
agent) to make the collective set inconsistent on any agenda
in ALL. Therefore, reasoning in ALL does not provide new
possibility results for classes of aggregators. In order to guar-
antee consistency, we need then to apply further restrictions
on the agenda in ALL that strengthen the median property
[Endriss et al., 2010]. We conclude this section with a posi-
tive result concerning acceptance-rejection neutrality. We fo-
cus on the case in which individual judgements sets are just
assumed to be consistent (i.e. they do not need to be com-
plete or deductively closed). Denote Jc(XL) the set of con-
sistent judgement sets wrt L. Dietrich and List [2009] have
shown that every aggregator that is acceptance-rejection neu-
tral and always returns consistent sets of judgement must be
a dictatorship of some individual (namely, the aggregator al-
ways copies the judgement set of some individual). The theo-
rem does not hold for the majority rule, provided we evaluate
group reasoning wrt to ALL or its linear closure.
Proposition 6. The majority rule M : Jc(XCL)n →
Jc(XALL) is an acceptance-rejection neutral aggregator that
is safe wrt ALL.
7 An application to preference aggregation
We want to sketch an application of our results to preference
aggregation. It is possible to express preference orderings
in JA by means of suitable sets of propositions [Dokow and
Holzman, 2010; Grandi and Endriss, 2011]. For example,
one introduces a propositional atom pa>b for each pair of al-
ternative such that a > b according to the preference order.
The usual axioms that characterise preference orderings can
be expressed by means of integrity constraint that are written
in classical logic. For example, transitivity amounts to as-
suming a set of constraints of the form: pa>b∧pb>c → pa>c.
Moreover, pa>b and pb>a behave as negations. Accordingly,
it is possible to view a Condorcet’s paradox as a case of dis-
cursive dilemma for a suitable agenda of propositions in CL.
pa>b pb>c pa>c
i1 1 1 1
i2 1 0 0
i3 0 1 0
maj. 1 1 0
The set obtained by majority violates the integrity constraint
imposed by transitivity. We apply our analysis of group rea-
soning to preference aggregation as follows. We can repre-
sent transitivity constraints by means of proper axioms in two
ways: additively, pa>b & pb>c ` pa>c and multiplicatively,
pa>b ⊗ pb>c ` pa>c. According to our previous analysis,
the multiplicative interpretation would make group reasoning
inconsistent, as we can infer {i1, i2}, {i1, i3} ` pa>b ⊗ pb>c
which by transitivity entails {i1, i2}, {i1, i3} ` pa>c against
{i2, i3} ` ¬pa>c. However, the additive version of transi-
tivity does not cause inconsistencies. Intuitively, the additive
axiom is weaker: it requires that transitivity holds only in case
there exists a single winning coalition supporting both pa>b
and pb>c. The additive interpretation of transitivity suggests a
narrower account of collective rationality: reasoning applies
only when the same group accepts the premises.
8 Conclusion
We have analysed collective rationality by means of the proof
theory of linear logic. By inspecting fragments of substruc-
tural reasoning, we have shown that is possible to provide
new possibility results. In particular, ALL provides general
safety results. It is worth stressing that the distinction be-
tween the possibility result for ALL and the impossibility re-
sult for ALL + W does not depend on the language of the
agenda, rather it depends on the fine properties of reasoning
encoded in sequent calculus. Moreover, we have modelled
aggregators that take judgements sets in CL, just as in the
standard JA, and we have shown that it is safe to view col-
lective rationality in ALL or MALL. Thus, if we stick to our
intuitive interpretation of LL that views additives as referring
to a single winning coalition and multiplicatives as combin-
ing possibly different winning coalitions, we have a consis-
tent interpretation of collective rationality. We have shown
that our safety results are no longer valid for weaker classes
of aggregator, thus for them substructural logics do not pro-
vide an interesting way out. We believe that the significance
of this approach is that proof theory allows for pinpointing the
logical causes of inconsistency and for exploring the relation-
ships between axioms of social choice theory and inference
rules. We have pointed at possible applications in preference
aggregation, once we express the constraints on preferences
as formulas in our logics. Future work shall investigate in
detail this aspects.
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